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CoNFLICT OF LAws--PENAL PnoVISIONS IN FoREIGN LA.w-LlABILITY OF 
SHAREHOLDERS IN DE FACTO CORPORATION-Defendants, residents of Tennessee, 
while attempting to form a corporation under the laws of Arkansas,1 inadvert-
ently failed to file the articles of incorporation with the county clerk, although 
they were filed with the Secretary of State of Arkansas. The resulting business 
association was an Arkansas de facto corporation.2 Under Arkansas law the 
shareholders of a de facto corporation are personally liable for the debts of the 
corporation.3 Plaintiff, a creditor who dealt with the corporation, sued in a 
Tennessee court and asked that the Arkansas rule be applied. The trial court 
refused to do so on the ground that it was penal in nature, and applied instead 
the Tennessee rule that shareholders of a de facto corporation are not personally 
liable for its debts. On appeal, held, aflirmed.4 Plaintiff petitioned for rehear-
ing, alleging conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit in Doggrell 11. Great Southern Box Co. of Mississippi,5 which held in 
deciding the same question that the Arkansas rule was not penal and the courts 
of Tennessee were therefore bound to apply it by the "full faith and credit" 
1 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §64-103. "Upon the filing with the Secretary of State of 
articles of incorporation, the corporate existence shall begin. Provided, however, a set of 
the Articles of Incorporation • • • shall be filed for record with the County Clerk. • • .'' 
2 A de facto corporation is formed if (a) there is a law in the state of alleged incorpo-
ration under which such corporation might be formed, (b) there is colorable or apparent 
intent, (c) in good faith to incorporate under such law, and (d) there is some corporate 
user. Frey, "Legal Analysis and the 'De Facto' Doctrine," 100 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 1153 
(1952). 
s Whitaker v. Mitchell Mfg. Co., 219 Ark. 779, 244 S.W. (2d) 965 (1952). Whit-
aker, an Arkansas resident shareholder of the corporation involved in the principal case, 
was held personally liable for the debts of the de facto corporation. Arkansas is one of the 
few jurisdictions so holding. 
4 Tennessee courts will apply the law of the state in which the corporation is domi• 
ciled unless that law is penal in nature. Sullivan v. Farnsworth, 132 Tenn. 691, 179 S.W. 
317 (1915). 
Ii (6th Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d) 671. 
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clause of the Constitution.6 Held, petition denied. Under the test applied by 
the federal court, as construed by the Tennessee court, the Arkansas rule is penal 
in nature and against the public policy of Tennessee. Paper Products Co. 11. 
Doggrell-, 195 Tenn. 581, 261 S.W. (2d) 127 (1953). 
There are three choice-of-laws theories operating in the courts of the United 
States today: comity (employed by the Tennessee court), vested rights, and the 
local law theory.7 By the use of these theories a court will at the proper times 
decide a case as it would be decided in the courts of a foreign state. If the 
rule of the foreign state is penal in nature the time is not proper. 8 This is the 
real basis for the court's decision in the principal case.9 There are two major 
tests used by the courts to determine the penal nature of a foreign rule: (I) 
the test proposed in the leading case of Huntington 11. Attrill,10 i.e., that a rule 
is penal when the offense proscribed is against the state and when the state 
alone can sue an offending party, and (2) the test whereby any allowable 
recovery which is more than compensatory is penal.11 The court in the princi-
pal case, though purporting to apply the Huntington test, actually responded to 
its own inclinations in concluding that the Arkansas rule is penal in nature.12 
The court said that the Arkansas rule has been formulated solely to enforce 
compliance with the Arkansas corporation statute13 and is therefore penal.14 
The court also emphasized the fact that the plaintiff dealt with the association 
as a corporation.15 It has also been held that a de facto corporation under the 
6 "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and 
judicial proceedings of every other State." U.S. CoNsT., art. IV, §1. The court relied 
upon Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 55 S.Ct. 589 (1935), which held state statutes 
to be entitled to "full faith and credit" in other states unless they are penal or contrary 
to the public policy of the latter state. 
7 Cheatham, "American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility," 58 
!Lutv. L. RJw. 361 (1945). 
s ''The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." "Marshall, C.J., in 
The Antelope, 10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 66 (1825). 
9 The court said also that the Arkansas rule was contrary to the public policy of Ten-
nessee, because the Tennessee rule was different. That this reason is not valid, see Loucks 
v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). 
10 146 U.S. 657, 13 S.Ct. 224 (1892). This case is controlling in all suits in one 
state on judgments obtained in another state under the "full faith and credit" clause. The 
foreign law must be penal in all respects: Great Western Machinery Co. v. Smith, 87 
Kan. 331, 124 P. 414 (1912). See also LeHar, "Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and 
Governmental Claims," 46 HARv. L. Rav. 193 (1932), for a survey of the common situa-
tions presenting problems as to when a law is penal. 
11 McLay v. Slade, 48 R.I. 357, 138 A. 212 (1927). 
12 The court cited Woods v. Weeks, 75 Tenn. 40 (1881), as controlling. This case 
held to be penal a New York statute which made shareholders of a de jure corporation 
personally liable for the debts of the corporation because of an omission of its directors. 
13 See note 1 supra. The court relied on the statement that corporate existence begins 
upon filing the articles of incorporation with the secretary of state. What, then, is the 
effect of the second sentence quoted'? 
14 It is submitted that limited liability can be achieved only by compliance with the 
corporation statute, and therefore the logical result of non-compliance is personal liability. 
Query whether this result is penal'? · 
15 That this may often be the basis for limiting the liability of shareholders of a de 
facto corporation, see Frey, "Legal Analysis and the 'De Facto' Doctrine," 100 Umv. PA. 
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laws of one state should be treated as a domestic de facto corporation in an-
other state.16 While this doctrine might have justified the decision in the 
principal case, it should be noted that its utilization would render unnecessary 
any application of a test as to the penal quality of the foreign law. Adherence 
to the test of penalty formulated in the Huntington case would do much to 
promote uniformity in choice-of-laws decisions. It is submitted, however, that 
a literal application of the "full faith and credit" clause would afford the best 
method of achieving this objective.17 
James M. Potter,. S.Ed. 
L. REv. 1153 (1952). See also the dissenting opinion in Doggrell v. Great Southern Box 
Co., (6th Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d) 671. 
10 First Title and Securities Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 211 Iowa 1019, 233 N.W. 137 
(1930). This case should be compared with Reed v. Appleby, 150 Tenn. 63, 262 S.W. 35 
(1923). In that case the Tennessee court applied an Oklahoma statute prohibiting a collat-
eral attack on an Oklahoma corporation's organization (a statute peculiarly applicable to 
de facto corporations). The court emphasized, however, the fact that Tennessee had a 
similar statute, thus implying that in the absence of a similar local rule, local law would be 
applied to a de facto corporation. See also the dissent in Doggrell v. Great Southern Box 
Co., note 15 supra. 
17 See Jackson, "Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution," 45 
CoL. L. RBv. 1 (1945). 
